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5 
Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the primary causes to Iranian foreign policy in the period from 2005 till 
the nuclear deal in July 2015. By examining the political situation in the Middle East and internally in 
Iran, it has become clear that Iran’s foreign policy is motivated primarily by strategic interest, rather 
than idealist reasoning. The important domestic factors are  e.g. their self-perception as a Shiite nation, 
and their revolutionary ideology and rhetoric, which have proven to be important mobilization factors. 
Furthermore, the institutional structure in Iran is an important factor. E.g. the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei holds veto on foreign policy matters, while supervising the political system, 
which is saturated by group competition between reformists, pragmatic conservatives and hardliners. 
The Iranian political system is a web of overlapping power centers, interests and personal ties, which in 
some cases has left the elected politicians with little power. The problematic Iranian economy and the 
conflict in Syria also influence the group competition between the political factions, as they disagree on 
whether Iran should remain isolated or open up politically and economically. In this thesis these 
variables is addressed in relation to Iran’s foreign policy in Syria and Lebanon. The theoretical 
framework applied is neoclassical realism, since this incorporates both regional and domestic 
perspectives that constitute the foreign policy. The neoclassical realism is found applicable to the case 
of Iran, as the systemic imperatives are the most important factor when the foreign policy is 
determined, but domestic factors matter as well.  
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Problem area 
 
The conflict-ridden Middle East 
The Middle East has witnessed several conflicts, which international relation scholars have various 
explanations for. They are primarily systemic explanations and focus on the Middle East as a regional 
system. None of the explanatory models can be used individually as they are connected. However, it is 
still possible to make a rough division into three arguments, giving a brief extract of the academic 
literature.  
 
According to Mahnaz Ispahani the insecurity domestically in the Middle East can be explained as a 
result of the post-colonial era. Lack of internal cohesion between nation and state causes illegitimacy to 
the regimes. This leads to fragmented states that foreign countries can exploit either through 
interventions or alliances. One must add the complexity of ethnic and class lines, which is an incentive 
to cooperation transcending borders to bring both political legitimacy to their regimes and to be 
resilient to a common threat (Ispahani, 1984: 154-156).  
 
Hinnebusch argues that the subordination to the Western economies have resulted in weak relations 
between states in the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2002: 3). The subordination has entailed a lack of 
financial horizontal ties, making Middle Eastern states vulnerable to domination from external powers 
(Ibid.). This lack of interdependency is, according to Hinnebusch, a consequence of the oil production, 
which causes a financial division between oil-producing countries and non-oil-producing countries. 
The former are merely focused on relations to oil-importing countries, and not the surrounding region 
(Ibid.: 7). These non existing economic and political ties are still a problem in 2016.  
 
A new explanation that has been on the crest of the waves the last ten years divides Islam into Sunni 
and Shia muslims, which e.g. are used to explain why Iran are in proxy conflicts against Sunni regimes 
(Takeyh, 2006: 81-82). However, in relation to conflicts in the Middle East, this model of explanation 
is rejected by various examples, as alliances in the region are primarily based on pragmatic decisions, 
e.g. is Iran supporting several Sunni groups in Palestine (Katzman, 2016: 5). Also, Iran’s alliance with 
Hezbollah and Syria has been explained as having anti-Sunni purposes, though this alliance was meant 
to balance the US (Cramer-Larsen & Jensen, 2014: 12 + 68). However, as the US has been less present 
in the region the last ten years, the Sunni/Shia divide has gained attention. 
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Isolated Iran 
The Shiite perception of Iran stems from the revolution of 1979. The revolution changed the power 
structure in the Middle East, and Iran became isolated in the Gulf and from the international society. 
The Arab States established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 without Iran and Iraq. 
Isaphani argues that the Arab states wanted to freeze out Iran and question their legitimacy as an 
Islamic regime (Ispahani, 1984). Iran is not yet (2014) a member of any regional organisation, unlike 
other states in the region (Juneau, 2014: 95). Being surrounded by Arab states and American allies puts 
Iran in a quite exceptional foreign policy situation (Katzman, 2016: 8). Despite that, Iran has made 
alliances in the region, e.g. in Lebanon and Syria. The motivation behind the alliance is their mutual 
enemies, US, Israel and the GCC (Khoury, 2013: 76 + 81) (Ibid., 2016: 13-17). 
 
Fragmentation in the Middle East 
As the alliance between Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria consists of both states and a non-state actor their 
relationship is relevant to study, since security policy in the Middle East in general has been 
characterised by a neorealist, state centric logic. The state centric logic has lost explanatory power as 
the Middle East has gotten fragmented and unstable. The fragmentation is by observers considered to 
partly be a consequence of a less aggressive US in the Middle East, since the former large-scale 
presence created stability in the region. As US have pulled out gradually, e.g. of Iraq, a vacuum has 
been created which has left room for other regional actors and groups to fill the space and gain power 
(Katzman, 2016: 9). Also, the democratic processes of the Arab Spring have led to unrest in the region, 
and in some instances civil war, and less powerful states. The fragmentation is evident by the presence 
of The Iraqi Kurdistan functioning as an independent state in Iraq, the same goes for the Kurdish in 
some areas in Syria. Also, 1,600 armed groups are controlling various areas in Syria. In the Sinai 
Peninsula in Egypt tribal and extremist groups are controlling different territories (Rubin, 2016). 
 
Fragmentation, instability and non-state actors complicate a neorealist model when analysing foreign 
policy in the Middle East, and the idea of state elites representing a uniform population must be 
modified (Ibid.: 339).  Though the international environment seems to have been an important 
determinant in Iranian foreign policy, domestic conditions have to be accounted for as well, in order to 
profoundly explain which causes that have led to the conducted foreign policy of Iran. E.g. the 
relevance of the political structure appears to have some significance, as the mixture of theocracy and 
republicanism entails special political features - among others, the veto power of the Supreme Leader. 
As neoclassical realism relies on both domestic and international causes, the research question is 
formulated as following. 
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Research question 
 
In a neoclassical perspective, how have the domestic conditions in Iran and the political situation in the 
Middle East influenced Iranian foreign policy from 2005 to 2016 in Lebanon and Syria? 
 
 
 
Sub-questions 
1. Which strategic interests has enabled Iran’s alliances with Syria and Hezbollah, and how has it 
influenced their response in Lebanon 2006 and Syria 2011 respectively?  
2. How has the self-perception in Iran influenced their foreign policy in Lebanon and Syria? 
3. How does the interaction between the hardliners, the pragmatic conservatives, and the 
reformists constitute Iranian foreign policy, and how is the outcome of the interaction 
influenced by other factors, such as economy and unrest in Lebanon and Syria? 
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Theoretical framework 
 
Following section is elaborating the theoretical framework of the thesis. The first section accounts for 
neoclassical realism. Second, neorealism is elaborated upon. Third, the application of both realism and 
constructivism is discussed in the section on philosophy of science. Lastly an exploration of 
neoclassical realism and the variables relevant in analysing Iran’s foreign policy.  
The Neoclassical Realist conception of variables in states’ 
foreign policies 
As the title indicates, the theory of neoclassical realism derives from the realist tradition, a tradition that 
also embraces neorealism and classical realism. The objective of this chapter is to explain how the 
relatively new-comer - neoclassical realism – draws upon important insights from both former theories, 
and thus creates a more complete framework for interpreting foreign policy. 
 
Neoclassical realism considers the international system, as described by the neorealists, as the 
independent variable, which is determined by the systemic imperatives. The systemic imperatives are 
the threats, opportunities, and relative power distributions that Iran perceives, based on actions by other 
states, both in the region and internationally. However, the theory does not neglect the insight of the 
complexity of statecraft found in classical realism (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009: 4). Drawing 
upon insights from both neorealism and classical realism, the causal logic of neoclassical realism is as 
follows: 
 
Figur 1 
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It is important to mention that the foreign policy of a state is first and foremost determined by the 
systemic imperatives, as neoclassical realists, when contemplating on relative power distributions use 
the theoretical insight of neorealism by Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt etc. (Taliaferro, Lobell & 
Ripsman, 2009: 4). It is thus a common analytical approach for neoclassical realists to first seek to 
explain the systemic imperatives using neorealism’s structural insight, and then try to explain how the 
given state chose (or failed) to react to those systemic imperatives by including relevant domestic 
variables.1  
 
Different neoclassical realists has emphasised different domestic variables which are believed to be 
highly influential. Of course, it varies from country to country which domestic factors are most 
important in relation to the given country’s foreign policy. Therefore, in this chapter there will be an 
explanation of different domestic variables together with a brief elaboration on why these domestic 
factors are of relevance when interpreting Iranian foreign policy. The domestic variables set out in this 
chapter will entail state autonomy, group competition and societal leaders. 
 
However, as mentioned above, the prime determiner of the conducted foreign policy is the systemic 
imperatives. Therefore, when analyzing the Iranian foreign policy one must also examine the world 
surrounding Iran. In this study, the ‘surrounding world’ will, not unlike other neoclassical analyses, be 
interpreted through the lenses of neorealism. Therefore, before the elaboration on domestic variables, 
there will be an explanation of the logic in Kenneth Waltz’ and Stephen Walt’s neorealist theory.  
Neorealism 
The neorealist theories by Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, which will be elaborated in the following, 
will contribute as a starting point of the analysis further in the study. An argument of the neorealist 
school of international relations is that the international system is decentralized, anarchic in structure 
and the most relevant actors are states (Waltz, 1979: 88). All states are considered similar in their self-
regarding structure and they have the same primary goal, which essentially is survival. This is why 
domestic factors are irrelevant to study, according to the neorealist point of view (Waltz, 1979: 91). 
The similarity of the structure of the units in the system entails that states are considered ‘black boxes’ 
(Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009: 17). The global system of power is considered a zero-sum game, 
meaning that whenever one state gains power another state loses power. E.g. in the context of Iran: If 
                                                
1 E.g. see Randall Schweller in the chapter ”Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age 
of mass politics” in the book “Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy”  
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Saudi Arabia carries out an expansionist foreign policy to gain power, Iran will lose power as a 
consequence. 
 
Neorealists argue that states interact militarily by balancing the military capabilities of other states, the 
method of balancing depends on the size of the state. Smaller states will perform external balancing, by 
building alliances with other states. Bigger states will perform internal balancing by transforming their 
economic capabilities into military capabilities (Waltz, 1979: 168-170). States are not aggressive in 
nature, but rather mirrors how surrounding states act. Hence, aggression by one state will be responded 
with aggression by another state, and restraint will be met with restraint (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013: 
49). The observation about states being defensive do however not lead to absence of conflict, as all 
politics is a never ending struggle between self-interested groups, and the condition for this struggle is 
characterized by scarcity and uncertainty (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009: 14-15). 
 
Stephen Walt elaborates on Waltz’ theory of balancing, by arguing that states balance threats rather 
than power, and that statesmen will consider the following factors when they identify whether a foreign 
state is a threat or an ally: aggregate power, geographical position, their offensive capabilities, and 
intentions (Walt, 1987: x). 
 
The aggregate power is, if a state's total resources gets greater, the greater potential threat it can be to 
others. This includes population, industrial and military capability and technological progress (Ibid.: 
22). The sum of the available power is important to the threat assessment, because a state's capacity can 
be transformed into military capability and either punish or reward others (Ibid.: 23). The geographic 
proximity is relevant as proximate states can pose a greater threat than states far away, simply because 
the threat is closer. (Ibid.). The offensive power involves the amount of offensive capabilities. States 
with a large amount of offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke other states. The immediate 
threat the offensive power poses could be an incentive to balance against the strong state by allying 
with other states (Ibid.: 24). Aggressive intentions, implies that states that are seen as aggressive are 
more likely to provoke others to balance against them. This includes states that have modest 
capabilities, but are aggressive in behaviour. The perception of state's intentions are important when 
alliances are formed (Ibid.). 
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Philosophy of science  
In order to fully understand the relevant intervening variables in Iranian foreign policy, this section 
argues how realism and constructivism can work together to incorporate matters such as group 
processes and collective identity in the Middle East and Iran.  
 
In Iran, the implications of group identities and competition seem reasonable to contemplate upon, 
since Iran is a somewhat fragmented country. Groupings that in this study will be characterised as ‘the 
reformists’, ‘the pragmatic conservatives’ and ‘the conservative hardliners’ seek political influence in 
Iran (See Political Structure). How the competition among these groups have influenced the self-
perception in Iran and thus its foreign policy, is relevant when analysing Iranian foreign policy. E.g. 
how has the eruption of rebellions in Syria been interpreted and used politically by the different 
groupings in Iran? 
 
However, questioning how a group constructs its identity via differentiation or how group formation is 
driven by internal and external competition is typically more of an objective in constructivism and can 
therefore seem misplaced in a thesis that works within a realist framework. However, Sterling-Folker 
argues that constructivism and realism can be applied together. She emphasises a central realist 
assumption - that tribalism is central to human beings. It is one of the core assumptions in realism that 
humans do not face one another as individuals, but as members of groups (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 82). 
The group formation, which is not learned behavior, but rather ontologically determined, creates 
dynamics of identification, social interaction, and construction of social practices (Ibid.: 82-84). Thus, 
the analysis will examine dynamics such as national collective identity, domestic competitions for 
national identity and domestic power struggles. 
Intervening variables 
The following will elaborate on the intervening variables that are assumed most relevant when 
determining influence on Iranian foreign policy. First, the group dynamics mentioned in the previous 
section will be outlined and put into the Iranian context, then the degree of state autonomy, the 
importance of societal leaders, and lastly ideology in the Middle East will be accounted for.  
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Group processes 
Out-group discrimination 
Sterling-Folker argues that one of the obvious implications of tribalism, is that the in-group and out-
group distinction should be considered a constitutive element in the individual identity formation. 
Sterling-Folker explains that members of groups will be prone to see members of other groups as 
competitors. She further argues, that no matter how alike the groupings are, and even in the absence of 
competing values, the mere perception of another group leads to in-group favoritism and out-group 
discrimination (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 84) 
 
The out-group discrimination is not only caused by tribalism but is also reified by the differences of 
social practices in each group that intergroup competition creates. Sterling-Folker argues that social 
practices and institutions that encourage further cooperation within the group, can strengthen the 
group’s cohesion and identification, thus making it more competitive relative to other groups. Because 
groups can differ in their social practices and institutions, the ongoing competition among groups can 
reify the difference in social practices, thus maintaining each group as different from each other 
(Sterling-Folker, 2002: 85). When considering Iran a group, the social practises that can be said to 
encourage further cohesion, are inter alia Shiite rituals. Hence, the Shiite aspect of the Iranian ideology 
(see Ideology in the Middle East) is creating cohesion within the Iranian group. 
 
However, the intragroup interaction is not only characterized with social practices and institutions that 
can encourage cohesion in the group. It is also characterized by competition among members, often 
over who gets what. Sterling-Folker explains, that the self-definitions that dominates state-policy can 
have as much to do with internal competition as external competition (Sterling-Folker, 2009: 116). This 
dynamic relationship between external and internal competition is also relevant in addressing Iranian 
foreign policy. E.g. in relation to the newly committed nuclear deal with the P5+1, it is hard to 
highlight either national or international considerations at the expense of the other. The reason for this, 
is that while the agreement facilitates domestic debate over economic benefits (Al-Monitor, 2016a), it 
could also be a result of a more passive US in the region.  
 
When contemplating on what can pose as intergroup competition, Sterling-Folker highlights the 
significance of milieu and circumstances, saying that, “ (...) negative comparisons or intergroup 
competition must [not, red.] necessarily involve violence, since variance in access to natural resources 
14 
and intergroup exposure also affect how much violence is a necessary component of group 
competition” (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 85). The neoclassical realist view that groups are an essential 
parameter in human social activity also produces explanatory power to why, otherwise different 
groups, integrate. Sterling-Folker argues that willingness to pool resources among different groups 
depends on the presence of a common enemy (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 86). 
What confines a group and why are nations important? 
Individuals can be members of multiple groups simultaneously: “(...) one can be a member of an ethnic 
group, a national group, a religious group (…), and so on” (Sterling-Folker, 2009: 111). Though 
multiple group membership is the norm, she argues that “(...) at any given historical moment particular 
collective identities are more pertinent than others” (Ibid.: 112). She explains that an indication that a 
particular collective identity is of severe importance, is that it decides resource allocation for its 
members. Erupting from this view is the perception that in contemporary life, the nation is the most 
pertinent. Sterling-Folker observes that contemporary nations have a unique prominence in relation to 
identity over other group identities. Other than this observation, she highlights a main characteristic of 
the nation, namely “ (...) its marriage to states as a particular type of social institution or process for 
determining intra group resource decisions (...)” (Ibid.).  
Ideology in the Middle East 
The following will introduce ideology as an example of how group identity affect policy-making in 
Iran. Treating states without regards to ideology is inadequate when analysing politics in the Middle 
East, as ideology, especially religious ideology, historically has played a crucial part in policy-making, 
and still does.  
  
Despite arguments about ideologies being less important following the end of the Cold War in 1991, 
there are several examples of the contrary, especially in the Middle East (Nasr, 2003: 67-68). Since the 
fall of communism, new ideologies have become increasingly important, and religion still plays a part 
in politics (Freeden, 2006: 250). In Iran, ideology was already evident in the revolution of 1979, as the 
former secular state was replaced by the Islamic Republic. Political leaders have since then been 
expected to act in accordance with the Islamic and idealist visions of the revolutionaries, as Iranian 
laws must be in accordance with both Islamic laws and the constitution if possible. If this is not 
possible, Islamic laws are given most weight (Thaler et.al, 2010:29).  
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Vali Nasr argues that politics in the Middle Eastern region are characterised by a dialectic relationship 
between secularism and ideology, where the state-building processes in general have been a struggle 
between the two. Throughout the region, state leaders have tried to subjugate religion to secularism, but 
religion continues to be an important factor (Nasr, 2003: 67-68). The Iranian religious leaders used the 
revolt in 1979 against the shah to put an end to the secular state and establish the Islamic Republic. It is 
however an ongoing struggle, as the electorate wanted more republicanism, which have resulted in 
elections being conducted (Ibid.: 69-71). Iran is therefore an example of how secularism and ideology 
are being mixed in politics. Ideology never replaced secularism as a consequence of the revolution, the 
two intertwine and cannot be clearly separated when analysing Iranian politics. Nasr argues that the 
fundamentalist powers in Iran have been decreasing, and it is likely that religion will play a smaller part 
in politics in the future (Ibid.: 69-70). In the section The Self Perception in Iran it will be analysed how 
the ideology articulated by the hardliners, has become an important part of Iran’s self perception. Thus 
ideology will be used to analyse Iranian foreign policy as a variable contributing to the secular, 
pragmatic and rational foreign policy, which structural realism argues that states conduct. 
State autonomy 
The degree of state autonomy is a variable concerning the degree of which domestic actors, such as the 
media, the public opinion, legislature, interest groups and other political actors are able to influence the 
decisions of the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) (Ripsman, 2009: 170-171). In the example of Iran, the 
FPE is the president Hassan Rouhani and the minister of foreign affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif. The 
domestic actors that will be the primary objects of analysis in this study will be the religious leaders 
and the Revolutionary Guard, as the political influence they possess institutionally will be analysed. In 
relation to foreign policy, state autonomy has the effect, that the higher the level of state autonomy is, 
the more rational the government can respond to systemic imperatives, as the FPE has access to 
privileged knowledge on foreign policy matters, and are thereby equipped to respond rationally (Ibid.: 
172). 
 
Thus the intervening variable state autonomy is relevant in explaining foreign policy. The power of 
domestic actors will increase as the autonomy of national security policy executives decrease and vice 
versa (Ibid.: 189). Ripsman argues that the autonomy is not determined by the type of regime, since it 
always will be a matter of degree, both within democracies and authoritative states (Ibid.: 189). When 
non-democratic executives have a high degree of autonomy, they will be able to shield themselves from 
societal elites and other domestic actors, such as the media or the people. Hereby they will not be 
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influenced in their foreign policy making, which will make them more able to respond to systemic 
imperatives (Ibid.: 190). The international environment also influences the degree of autonomy of the 
executive. For instance, if there are immediate threats concerning the country, the executive will be 
more autonomous than in times with few or no threats. In this situation domestic actors will be able to 
influence the timing and manner of aggressive foreign policy (Ibid.: 191). The degree of state 
autonomy in Iran was evident in Khatami’s presidential period between 1997-2005. Khatami stood for 
a more reformist political position, both in domestic and foreign matters, which did not align with the 
conservative religious leaders, and therefore they countered his attempts to conduct policies (Ibid.: 184-
185). This is an example of how the domestic actors interpreted the response to systemic imperatives 
differently than the FPE, leading to an obstruction of the FPE’s policy. 
Societal leaders 
The following section elaborates the role of societal leaders’ influence on foreign policies. First, this 
section will introduce the theoretical definition, the role and the effects societal leaders have on a 
state’s policy making. Second, it will be argued that Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) can be defined as societal leaders. 
 
According to Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, societal leaders can be defined as imposing religious, 
cultural or economic meanings at the domestic level. Their consent in the development of a state’s 
foreign policy is an important factor. If a state and a societal leader have different views upon an 
ascending foreign power, a societal leader, if powerful enough, will be able to influence whether the 
foreign state is considered a national threat or not (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, 2009: 57).  
  
Theoretically there exists two societal coalitions within societal leaders; internationalist and nationalist. 
An internationalist can be defined as societal leader who “(…) entails heightened participation in the 
international system. They prosper from greater economic, political, and military engagement in the 
international system.” (Ibid.: 58). Nationalist societal leaders are defined as members of “(…) non-
internationally competitive sectors and domestically orientated groups. (…) [who, red.]  favor limiting 
international involvement by restricting military spending to defense of the homeland (…)” (Ibid.: 59). 
  
In the analysis Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are interpreted 
as being societal leaders. The Supreme Leader will be classified as such despite having several 
institutional powers that normally is a privilege of the FPE. E.g. he can veto on policies that he 
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disagrees with, and he has his own bureau that provides him with privileged knowledge on foreign 
policy matters (See Political Structure). However, he is not a part of the governmental institution or the 
day-to-day work of foreign policy, and Iran is represented internationally by the president and his 
minister of foreign affairs, and therefore Khamenei is considered a societal leader. The IRGC is 
characterised as a societal leader despite some members also being part of the governmental 
bureaucracy, which especially was the case during Ahmadinejad’s presidential period (Nader, 2015: 4). 
This is however not the norm, as the IRGC primarily functions outside of the state apparatus, and their 
status as a strong military and economic actor leads to a characterisation of the Guard as being a 
societal leader. A further elaboration of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC is found in the section 
Political Structure. 
 
Methodology 
In the following chapter is the methodology elaborated. The first section addresses the 
operationalization of the theoretical concepts. It is followed by an account for the empirical data used 
in the thesis. Afterwards is it argued why Iran is chosen as main case and Syria and Lebanon as 
underlying cases. Additionally is the simplification of the three main political groups in Iran addressed, 
followed by a section on the thesis’ causation logic. Lastly is the delimitation of the thesis addressed.  
Operationalization 
In the following section the main theoretical concepts will be accounted for. As a prolonging of Theory, 
this section will mainly explain what type of concepts balancing, state autonomy, and societal leaders 
and groups are, and how they will be measured in the analysis.  
Balancing  
The two terms internal - and external balancing is important in clarifying how states’ have chosen to 
react on particular events and describe relationships among states. As internal balancing indicates the 
transformation of economic capabilities into military capabilities, internal balancing will be measured 
on Iran’s development in military spending relative to other countries. However, identifying internal 
balancing this way is problematic. While countries might spend roughly the same amount on military 
expenditures, or even totally different amounts, the expenditures does not indicate how much the 
expenditures give in return. Due to difference in productivity and technology, there can be a difference 
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in how much ‘bang for the buck’ is received. As for this reason, difference in military expenditures will 
be interpreted carefully, supported by other interpretations and only large differences among countries 
from 1990 till 2015 will be interpreted as an indicator for internal military balancing (or lack of the 
same). External balancing will be identified from public statements concerning alliances, arms transfer 
and economic and military aid. 
  
State autonomy  
 
State autonomy is an additive concept. In this thesis the level of Iran’s state autonomy will be measured 
on the ability of people or institutions, outside what is considered the foreign policy executive, to trump 
the conducted foreign policy. The analysis thus relies on an institutional interpretation.  
 
Measuring the level of state autonomy implicates three problems that must be addressed. First, while an 
institutional analysis might indicate that a low degree of state autonomy is present, it could be the case 
that these institutions or societal leaders does not (or cannot) take advantage of their position in praksis. 
To display the level of state autonomy this problem will be addressed by conducting a historic 
overview that is looking for inconsistencies between the FPE’s and societal leaders’ perception of 
which foreign policy should be conducted. The outcome in relation to these inconsistencies will thus 
display the degree of state autonomy. 
 
The second problem is that while an institutional analysis might claim that certain societal leaders or 
institutions possess decisive weight over foreign policy, it is not sure that they disagree with the FPE, 
thus making it possible to misinterpret what really is a general agreement between the FPE and societal 
leaders as a high degree of state autonomy. This will be addressed by clarifying how powerful societal 
leaders perceive the correct foreign policy.   
 
The third problem that needs to be addressed concerns the matter of relativism. Though complying with 
the above guidelines, and identifying several institutions and persons with power over the FPE, it is 
difficult to assess the degree of state autonomy in Iran, as the theory does not entail specific parameters 
for how powerful actors outside the FPE is, when categorizing a low degree of state autonomy. 
Addressing this, the analysis will assess Iran’s state autonomy by comparing it diachronically. 
However, this only solves the problem halfway, as such a comparison cannot explain whether an 
identified decrease in state autonomy, has gone from low to very low or from very high to high. 
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Nationalist or internationalist societal leaders 
The definition of societal leaders being either nationalists or internationalists will be based on whether 
they encourage the Iranian FPE to isolate Iran, or engage in a more proactive foreign policy. In 
accordance with neoclassical realist theory, this will be based on military, economic, and political 
parameters. The political parameter tends to overlap with the two others, and the operationalization of 
this will therefore not be elaborated. The analysis of the societal leaders will also have a diachronic 
perspective, as the interests of the societal leaders depends on the situation in other countries, and 
therefore changes over time. 
  
Whether a societal leader is defined as a nationalist or internationalist militarily, will be based on 
whether they encourage the FPE to engage in conflicts outside of Iran, such as the proxy wars in 
Lebanon and Syria, or if they encourage the FPE to conduct a defensive security policy. The division of 
nationalists and internationalists is not necessarily obvious on the military parameter, as the policy can 
be framed as both defensive and offensive, depending on the perspective. E.g. does the Iranian policy-
makers tend to argue that their engagement in Syria is a defensive action, as they protect their alliance 
partner and respond to other states’ aggressive behaviour. 
  
The division of societal leaders into internationalists and nationalists on the economic parameter will be 
based on their approach to the economic sanctions towards Iran. Iran has since the revolution of 1979 
been isolated economically through sanctions from the Western world, meaning that they have very 
few trading partners. An internationalist societal leader would encourage the FPE to open up the 
Iranian economy, and also engage in negotiations about shutting down the Iranian nuclear programme, 
since this is a decisive factor in the maintenance of the economic sanctions. Contrary, a nationalist 
societal leader would want the Iranian economy to stay isolated. This parameter can however also be 
ambiguous, as the abandonment of the sanctions also has a political aspect. A societal leader might be 
for a liberalisation of the Iranian economy, but also against negotiating with Western countries, which 
seems to be the case with the IRGC (Nader, 2015: 4). 
Empirical data  
This thesis relies on secondary literature from Middle East or Iran scholars. They represent various 
international relation positions and contribute to a nuanced view on Iran's foreign policy. Using 
secondary literature is somewhat not unproblematic, because the analysis is based on their conclusions 
and not by first hand empirical data. This is met by presenting a broad spectrum of literature on the 
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subject, incorporating the different positions of the academia. As the academia is characterised by 
mutually exclusive explanations in some instances, the extremities of the narratives will be presented, 
and the scholars leaning towards them mentioned. First it will be clarified which and how different 
scholars have interpreted Iran’s conflict with Saudi Arabia. Then how different scholars perceives the 
Iran-US relations will be explained. The next narratives concern their interpretation of Hezbollah and 
Syria.   
 
An ongoing narrative in the literature is that Iran is in a regional war against Saudi Arabia because of 
their antagonistic religious basis. Iran being Shia, Saudi Arabia being Sunni. This narrative is 
represented by scholars such as Hokayem and Wilner & Cordesman. On the other hand, scholars such 
as Malmvig, Cramer-Jensen & Jensen and Katzman find that Iran and Saudi Arabia are conducting 
proxy wars because of a common goal of regional influence. 
 
Another main division in the literature concerns whether or not Iran loathes US and all its allies. The 
narrative describing Iran as overwhelming anti-American is presented by Hokayem and Katzman. 
Takeyh, Tahler, Nader, Hinnebusch, Monshipouri & Dorraj, and Posch find that it is merely an 
“us/them” rhetoric, and an evidence of the fragmented political landscape in Iran. Some groups in Iran 
try to sustain legitimacy by addressing their hate towards US and its allies, while other groups wish to 
approach US etc. as a result of financial problems and unsatisfied citizens.  
 
As of Hezbollah, Katzman and Hokayem characterize them as Iran’s prolonged arm, while Goordarzi, 
Kamrava, Addis & Blanchard, and Haugbølle find that Hezbollah are an autonomous group, and their 
internal group competition suggest that they are not an entity. Also, Hokayem and Katzman perceive 
Assad’s Alawite religion as a variation of Shia Islam,  and argue that this is a main reason of their 
alliance, while Elling, and Fulton et al. explain their alliance as being based on strategic interests.  
 
Case 
This section elaborates on the arguments for choosing Iran as the main case, and Syria and Lebanon as 
underlying cases. Iran is chosen due to its distinctive security political situation on the basis of existing 
data and information from scholars. Iran is practically surrounded by Arabian countries that perceive 
Iran as an outsider and a threat. This situation puts Iran in a different political situation compared to the 
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other countries in the Gulf. Iran is the only country bordering the Gulf, which is not a member of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which puts Iran in a situation of potential antagonistic countries in 
their proximity (Ispahani, 1984: 156 + 161). 
 
The isolation are thus the basis of choosing the underlying cases. Iran supports several groups and 
governments, but their most profound allies are Hezbollah and Syria. Their triangular relationship since 
the 1980’s indicates that they are loyal allies, and it is thus interesting to examine how the foreign 
policy has developed simultaneously with a change of the security political situation in Middle East. 
 
The simplification of political groups 
As mentioned in the Political Structure, the political actors in the Iranian system will be divided into 
three factions, the hardliners, the pragmatic conservatives, and the reformists. The political actors and 
their interests are however not as clearly divided, as the categories tend to overlap, the interests of the 
group change over time, and the actors can not necessarily be affiliated with just one group. E.g. is the 
current president Rouhani in general considered a reformist, but he has spent 16 years in the SNSC, 
working closely with the Supreme Leader, and he is in the conservative end of the reformist group 
(Jadaliyya, 2016). The literature also exhibits different positions on whether Ayatollah Khamenei is 
true to the ideology of the revolution (Sadjadpour, 2015: 3), or if he is a pragmatic leader (Posch, 2013: 
17). The complexity of the interests of the different actors will be further elaborated in the analysis, but 
an overall categorisation is useful as a pedagogical tool to understand the mechanisms of Iranian 
policy-making. It will be used to pinpoint the power struggles in the Iranian political system, and to 
determine which factions that are dominant.  
Causation 
The method of process tracing has been used in this thesis, more profoundly Systematic Process 
Analysis. It is an abductive method that is used to test causation between the independent, the 
intervening, and the dependent variable. According to Trampusch and Palier,   the process is iterative - 
a back and forth movement between theory and empirical evidence, which contributes to a renewal of 
the theory (Trampusch & Palier, 2016: 13). According to Hall, there are four steps in the technique of 
Systematic Process Analysis (Hall, 2006: 27-28). The following will elaborate and link the steps to the 
various sections of this thesis.  
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1. Theory formation: The first step is that the researcher begins “(…) by formulating a set of theories 
that identify the principal causal variables said to conduce to a specific type of outcome to be 
explained (...) how those and other variables interact in the causal chain that leads to the outcome.” 
(Ibid.: 27). This is expressed in the Theoretical framework section, where a profound elaboration of 
how Iranian domestic and Middle East structural variables relate to each other and how they influence 
Iranian foreign policy (see Figure 1 for the causal logic of neoclassical realism). 
  
2. Deriving predictions: Here “(…) the investigator then derives predictions about the patterns that will 
appear in observations of the world if the theory is valid and if it is false.” (Ibid.). In this step the 
theoretical concepts are operationalized. The purpose is that the empirical precision of the theoretical 
framework makes it possible to analyse to which degree the variables have influenced the foreign 
policy. It is an important step in the thesis because if it is done imprecisely, it is not be possible to 
conclude whether or not the variables influence the policies. See Operationalization.  
 
3. Making observations: According to Hall “An observation consists of a piece of data drawn from, or 
‘observed’, in that case, using whatever technology is appropriate for securing it, whether 
documentary research, interviews, or computation.” (Ibid.). Here the literature has been collected from 
various Iran and Middle East scholars that relates to Iranian foreign policy in Lebanon and Syria. It has 
been done with a profound reading of research and by following the academic references in order to 
find new empirical data. This process has been continued. After extensive and ongoing research for 
data, it appeared that the scholars referred to one another, which indicated that the core of literature on 
Middle Eastern relations and Iranian foreign policy was found. For an elaboration of the various 
positions in the literature, see Empirical data. 
 
4. Drawing conclusions: As a part of the iterative process, it will continuously be discussed whether or 
not there is congruence between the theory and the empirical data, in this thesis this is explicit in the 
sub-conclusions. As a part of the iterative process, it will continuously be discussed whether or not 
there is congruence between the theory and the empirical data, in this thesis this is explicit in the sub-
conclusions. Last, sub-conclusions will be brought together in the final conclusion, and the explanatory 
power of the theory in relation to the empirical evidence will be evaluated as a whole. See Conclusion. 
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Delimitation 
An element of Iranian foreign policy that could have been relevant for this study, but has not been 
incorporated, is the nuclear deal, which was negotiated with the P5+1 countries on July 14, 2015. The 
economic sanctions towards Iran, their military build-up, and their diplomatic relations with the West 
are all analysed, but despite the nuclear deal being related to this, the deal will not be analysed 
explicitly. It is mentioned as an example of Iran’s diplomatic relations with the West, and it has also 
contributed to escalating the conflict with Saudi Arabia. However, the deal has not been found relevant 
as it has not gone into effect yet, and therefore analysing it would be premature.   
 
Historical Context 
 
The following section will provide an overview of the history of Iran, focusing on the period around the 
Islamic revolution of 1979 and after. Emphasis will be on political events that can be related to either 
the foreign policy or the intervening variables, described in the Theoretical framework section. Iran 
has, especially in Middle Eastern standards, a long and unique history, which has been dominated by 
power clashes and invasions by foreign nations, leading to an Iran-centric worldview (Ehteshami, 
2002: 286) (Bertram, 2008: 17).  
 
The revolution of 1979 that led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and overthrew the 
shah, who was the regent of the secular monarchy, was an effect of several factors. According to 
Ehtesmani, two of the determining factors were growing inequality in Iran, and a desire to gain 
independency from the West (Ehteshami, 2002: 286-88). The dissatisfaction was evident among 
students, intellectuals and liberals, who initiated the riots. The Islamic powers of the society ‘took over’ 
the revolution as they provided an alternative to the shah that the fractionated opposition all could  
support. However, the leftist, secular, and liberal parts of the revolution were probably not well 
informed about the visions of the Islamic leader Khomeini, or they assumed that they could influence 
him after the establishment of the Islamic Republic (Hunter, 2014: 255-256). The outcome of the 
revolution was however, that the religious and conservative parts of the revolution ended up in the 
powerful political positions, where they argued that sovereignty only belongs to God, and therefore 
republicanism should only be relevant when Islam had no clear laws (Ibid.: 256). In practice, this 
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meant the establishment of a top-down Islamisation of Iran, leading to violations of democratic right, 
individual liberties and gender demands (Jadaliyya, 2016). 
  
Post-revolution 
The revolution also led to a change in the foreign policy of Iran. The new leaders intended to conduct a 
more proactive and Islamic foreign policy, and become a regional hegemon. This included support to 
several Muslim movements in foreign countries, most notably Lebanese Hezbollah, but also several 
Sunni-Muslim movements. In general, the foreign policy took a shift towards being more anti-
American and provocative against other regional actors (Ehteshami, 2002: 284). The clearest example 
of this is the war with Iraq from 1981-1988. Besides fighting the Sunni-Muslim Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein, Iran gained several enemies in the region, and was to some extent fighting a proxy war with 
the US, who supported Hussein. Towards the end of the war, only Syria, Libya, and Southern Yemen 
were considered allies. Therefore, the Iranian FPE took the pragmatic decision when ending the war, 
and improving the relations with the neighbouring Arab countries (Ehtesmani, 2002: 297-298), despite 
The Supreme Leader Khomeini compared the truce to drinking “a cup of poison”. 
  
The pragmatic turn 
The period after the war with Iraq was characterised by a more pragmatic turn. Economic growth 
became increasingly important (Takeyh, 2006: 45), and the balance between Islam and republicanism 
was to a higher degree questioned (Hunter, 2014: 257). An example of this is seen in Iran’s 
involvement in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iran supported the Christian Armenia 
instead of the Muslim Azerbaijan, as this was more in line with Iran’s security policy interests (Elling, 
2016: 3). Exactly why this pragmatic turn happened is difficult to determine, as several factors may 
have contributed. Among possible explanations are the death of Khomeini and selection of Khamenei 
as new Supreme Leader in 1989, a general tendency to being tired of war after the devastating war with 
Iraq, the rather moderate presidential period of Akbar Rafsanjani, and the willingness to open up the 
economy as an effect of American sanctions. Also, Khomeini might have wanted this pragmatic turn, 
as he on his deathbed declared that the future of the nation of Iran always should be the number one 
priority (Ibid.). Determining the foreign policy as being pragmatic and Rafsanjani as being moderate is 
however ambiguous, as Rafsanjani also reopened the nuclear programme, that the shah began in the 
70’s (Takeyh, 2006: 136-138). 
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In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected president (Jadaliyya, 2016). Despite not being pro-Western 
or democratic, Khatami was considered a moderate president, as he attempted to reform Iranian 
politics, by improving relations with the West and including the Iranian civil society in the policy-
making (Takeyh, 2006: 129). Khatami’s efforts to reform Iran are largely considered a failure though 
(Hunter, 2014: 260). In his first presidential period, the Guardian Council (See Political Structure ) 
vetoed the parliament (Majles) and military groups were violent towards reformist opinion formers, 
leading to conservative policies being conducted. In Khatami’s second presidential period, the 
Guardian Council worked for a conservative Majles, which made reforms even more difficult. The 
international political setting was also difficult to manoeuvre in, as the Bush administration declared 
that Iran was part of ‘the Axis of Evil’, despite Iranian cooperation during the NATO-led operation in 
Afghanistan (Takeyh, 2006: 128-129). This strengthened the anti-American discourse of the 
conservatives and made Khatami’s moderation of Iranian foreign policy almost impossible.  
  
In 2005 Khatami was followed by the hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had strong ties with the 
IRGC. The election can be seen as a unification of hardliners and conservatives as a consequence of the 
absent results of Khatami’s presidency (Jadaliyya, 2013). Ahmadinejad was elected under controversial 
circumstances, as the Guardian Council and Khamenei ratified him, and thereby made their sympathies 
obvious (Takeyh, 2006: 9-10). Ahmadinejad was a quite populist candidate, who promised to improve 
the economy of both Iran and the Iranian population, the latter by giving each citizen a small part of the 
oil revenue (Jadaliyya, 2013). However, the economy worsened during his presidential period, inter 
alia because he stood on his ‘right’ of having a nuclear programme (Bertram, 2008: 43). Ahmadinejad 
conducted a controversial foreign policy, characterised by aggressive rhetoric against the US and 
known for the so-called ‘Holocaust convention’, where the existence of Holocaust were put into 
question. 
  
Both the worsening of the economy and the undiplomatic foreign policy of Ahmadinejad seem to have 
been factors in the election of Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013. The failed financial politics during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidential period along with stricter sanctions by the West led to a rise of the so-
called Green Movement, where the Iranian population demonstrated for more reformist policies 
(Hunter, 2014: 263). The Iranian authorities treated the movement roughly, but the unrest seems to 
have been heard by Khamenei, as he allowed the reform-friendly candidate Rouhani to be elected 
(Jadaliyya, 2014). Despite often being characterised as a reformist president, Rouhani also has 
conservative characteristics, and has worked closely with Khamenei before (Jadaliyya, 2016). 
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Political Structure 
 
The following section will explain the political structure of Iran. This includes an explanation of how 
the religious and the political leaders relate to each other and where the power is located in the 
constitution. An understanding of the political structure is especially relevant when analysing the 
degree of state autonomy and the position of the Iranian societal leaders. It is important to note that 
there is a difference between the official and the actual influence that political actors in Iran hold. The 
official and actual powers are primarily inconsistent due to three factors. First, the person in charge 
matters. In the complex Iranian political system, the actors have to act politically smart to be able to use 
the powers that their position entails. Second, the mixture of theocracy and democracy is a challenge. 
Iranian laws have to be in accordance with both Islamic law and the Iranian constitution, which in some 
cases can be contradictory. Third, the different institutions have overlapping responsibilities on several 
policy areas, often resulting in a power struggle within the political system between the political actors 
(Thaler et.al., 2010: 21-22).  
 
In general, the religious and political leaders can be divided into reformists, pragmatic conservatives 
and hardliners, with different approaches to the relationship between pragmatism and the revolutionary 
ideology being their key difference. The reformists advocate a more open relationship with the West, 
the hardliners are true to the Islamic vision of the revolution of 1979, and the pragmatic conservatives 
place themselves in between as they reluctantly argue that a more open Iran is necessary (Kamrava, 
2007: 84-92).2. The most important actors are the following: 
The Supreme Leader 
The Supreme Leader is the most powerful actor in the Iranian political system, as he has direct or 
indirect influence in all the powerful political and religious institutions, despite strictly speaking not 
being part of the governmental apparatus. (Posch, 2013: 11). He is appointed by the Assembly of 
Experts, and is appointed for life. He has a high degree of power as he appoints the following: 6 clerics 
for the Guardian Council, senior staff officials, military leaders, the head of judiciary, heads of media 
institutions, Friday-prayer leaders, and also ratifies presidential candidates (Thaler et.al., 2010: 24). The 
                                                
2 In Kamrava (2007) the groups are called the radicals, the traditionalist conservatives and the reformers. In this thesis these 
will be characterised as mentioned here.  
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Supreme Leader also has the advantage of being provided with knowledge and advice by The Office of 
The Supreme Leader. The Bureau has access to opinion-forming processes of the foreign policy, giving 
The Supreme Leader access to privileged knowledge. His foreign policy powers are also constituted by 
his role as a religious leader of the Shia-Muslims. He has strong ties with religious and political leaders 
in other Shiite countries, most evident in his relationship with Hezbollah (Posch, 2013: 11-12). The 
current Supreme Leader is Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, who is the second Supreme Leader 
in the history of Iran. He used to be president, but was appointed Supreme Leader in 1989 (Takeyh, 
2006: 31-33).  
The President 
The President of Iran is the formal head of the executive branch. The electorate appoints him for four 
years, up to two terms, but only after being approved by the Guardian Council. On day-to-day matters 
the powers of the Iranian President are similar to most other executives’, including representing Iran 
internationally (Thaler et.al., 2010: 25). He must however answer to the parliament, the Supreme 
National Security Council, which he sits in, and The Supreme Leader when conducting foreign policy. 
This is problematic, as the President is basically powerless if the Supreme Leader withdraws his 
support for him (Posch, 2013: 8). In practice, he is therefore second in command after the Supreme 
Leader, who can obstruct policies before implemented by the President. Hence, the relationship 
between the President and The Supreme Leader is an example of overlapping responsibilities, with the 
religious leader having the last word. Another example is the Council of Minsters, who is appointed by 
the President. Their responsibilities are similar to those of the Office of The Supreme Leader, leading 
to power struggles (Thaler et.al., 2010: 26). The current president is Hassan Rouhani, who was elected 
in 2013. He is considered a moderate politician, who tries to conduct reformist policies (Hunter, 2014: 
253). 
 
The Majles 
The Majles is the parliament of Iran, who is appointed by the electorate for a four-year period. The 
Guardian Council must approve all candidates (Thaler, et. al, 2010: 22). The Guardian Council also has 
the power to intervene in the policy-making of the Majles if they consider a law inconsistent with either 
Islamic law or the Iranian constitution. The Expediency Council settles disputes between the two 
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institutions (Thaler et.al., 2010: 27). The Majles does not have direct power in Iranian foreign policy, 
but international topics are being discussed in the parliament, which can influence the policies.  
 
The Guardian Council 
The Guardian Council consists of twelve jurists, six of them are also clerics, and appointed by the 
Supreme Leader. The Head of the Judiciary, who is appointed by The Supreme Leader, appoints the 
other six. The power of the Guardian Council is that it can veto laws from the Majles, if they do not 
believe that they comply with either Islamic law or the Iranian constitution. Besides this, they approve 
candidates for the Majles, for president, and for the Assembly of Experts. They have not got much 
direct influence on foreign policy, besides checking that the conducted policy complies with Islamic 
law and the constitution. The Guardian Council is in general dominated by conservative hardliners 
(Thaler et.al., 2010: 29). 
  
The Assembly of Experts 
The Assembly of Experts is chosen for eight years by the electorate, after candidates have been 
approved by the Guardian Council. Their function is to appoint and supervise The Supreme Leader. 
They also have the authority to dismiss him, but this is yet to happen. The members must be experts in 
Islamic law and are generally religious conservatives. Despite having a constitutionally important role, 
the Assembly of Experts is in general not a very active actor in Iranian politics (Thaler et.al., 2010, 28-
29). 
  
The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) 
The SNSC is the primary body for determining Iranian defence and security policy (Thaler et.al., 2010: 
32). The membership is fluid depending on the issue discussed, but with some permanent members. 
The President chairs the council, which also comprises important military leaders (chiefs of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Artesh), the secret service, the minister of foreign affair, the secret 
service, representatives of The Supreme Leader, and other ministers when required. In general, it is a 
technical, administrative body that takes care of routine foreign policy subjects. However, it is also a 
forum where the actors can exercise power, present ideas, and plan foreign policy (Posch, 2013: 9). The 
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body presents their conclusions as consensus decisions, after being approved by The Supreme Leader 
meaning that he in reality has the last word (Thaler et.al., 2010: 32). 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
IRGC was created just after the revolution in 1979 by Khomeini. According to Thaler et. al, the Guard 
was made because Khomeini doubted that the regular army (The Artesh), who was a remnant from the 
Shah-regime, would be faithful to the Islamic Republic (Thaler et. al., 2010: 32). The IRGC’s main 
task is to ensure the survival and internal security of the Iranian regime (Ibid.: 33). The commander, 
Qusem Soleimani, is chosen by the Ayatollah, and only  has to answer to him (Ibid.: 59). Thaler argues 
that the IRGC can be considered a state within the state of Iran, because of their huge influence on the 
military, politics and financial sectors (Ibid.). Further is the IRGC “(...) oversees or owns important 
interests in numerous sectors (...) including oil, construction, agriculture, mining, transportation, 
defense policy and import/export.” (Thaler et. al, 2010: 59).  
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Analysis 
The analysis is divided into three sections based on the sub-questions. The first section will examine 
how Iran has assessed and responded to the events in Lebanon and Syria since 2005 and 2011 
respectively. The second section addresses how Iran’s self-perception has influenced their foreign 
policy in Syria and towards Hezbollah. The third section examines how the interaction between the 
hardliners, the pragmatic conservatives and the reformists constitute Iranian foreign policy and how the 
outcome of this interaction is influenced by other factors, such as political structure and economy. 
Moreover, it will be examined if Hezbollah’s relation to the Lebanese government and the civil war in 
Syria have had an evident feedback mechanism. 
 
First sub-question 
Before addressing how Iran has assessed and responded to the events in Lebanon and Syria since 2005 
and 2011 respectively, the strategic interest of the alliances with Syria and Hezbollah will elaborated 
upon. As neorealism indicates, the methods of balancing is determined by the balance of power among 
the nations that compete. Therefore, this analysis elaborates on the development in the military 
competition and balance among Iran and relevant actors in the Middle East. Furthermore, the dynamics 
that have been characteristic for Middle East interstate conflict will be elaborated upon, as it is 
perceived to possess decisive weight on strategic choices. Then, an analysis of the Iranian assessment 
of the events in Lebanon and Syria will be conducted. How the response and assessment can be 
explained in relation to neorealism will be evaluated continuously. 
 
The anti-American agenda and the quest for regional influence 
The intense relationship between Iran and the US and their preferred alliance partners dates back to the 
Iranian revolution in 1979. As explained in the Historical Context, the foundation of the Islamic 
Republic meant an adoption of an anti-American foreign policy, which worked towards establishing 
Iran as a regional hegemon (Ehtesmani, 2002: 297). 
  
An important factor in Iran’s foreign policy, is the perception that the US is seeking to dominate the 
Middle East and contain Iran’s power and influence. Doing so, the US has sanctioned Iran militarily by 
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excluding them from being provided with arms sales and military technology. The US has also 
pressured China and Russia to do the same. Besides trying to isolate Iran from the international 
weapons market, US have also balanced each Iran through the use of proxies. An example of this is the 
Iran-Iraq war between 1980-1988, in which US supported Iraq and Saddam Hussein (Wilner & 
Cordesman, 2011: 6). Moreover, the US has offered support to alliances in the region to counterbalance 
Iran. An example is the US support of the Saudi Arabian army, which has received billions of dollars in 
support (ibid.). Iran also perceives the relation between Israel and US as imperialistic behavior. The 
Iranian perception that the US is a threatening power with interest in the region is evident in the 
following quote from Ahmad Vahidi, Iranian Minister of Defense, who in 2010 contemplated on the 
American presence in the Middle East: “The US’ Iran ‘scenario’ is intended to create an excuse for its 
illegitimate presence and the sale of weapons in the region” (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 18). 
  
One method available when pursuing regional hegemony is internal balancing against opposing 
countries in the region. However, the military expenditure in the Middle East illustrates that relative to 
Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iran has not succeeded in a military build-up. In 1990 Iran spend 5,653 million 
US$, compared to Saudi Arabia’s 21,586 milion US$ and Israel’s 12,556 US$. After peaking in 2006 
with 14,275 million US$, probably due to Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel, Iran spend  9,969 million 
US$ in 2015 while Saudi Arabia spend 80,762 US$ and Israel 18,106US$. That Saudi Arabia have 
continuously become militarily superior to Iran through the last two decades is to some extent evident 
when comparing Saudi Arabia (green line) and Israel (red line) to Iran (blue line). 
 
However, using military expenditures to identify internal balancing, has to be done carefully. Three 
implications has to be considered. First, is the matter of motive. The increased expenditure may not be 
done in order to balance. The numbers displayed in figure 2 covers a long period, thus making it 
possible that Iran’s increase primarily has been due to economic growth. Furthermore, the military 
capability can not be measured only by military expenditures, as it varies from country how much 
military value is received from the expenditures. Moreover, factors that also influence military 
capability such as military preparedness, accumulated knowledge and experience is not represented in 
military expenditure. The most important factor excluded in military expenditure is nuclear capabilities 
(Cordesman, 2016). Iran has until the nuclear agreement with 5+1, insisted on maintaining their nuclear 
program. In relation to neorealism, developing nuclear capabilities is a clear indication of internal 
balancing.  
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Because these implications has to be considered, only large differences in expenditures among 
countries can be interpreted as an effort (or lack of) to perform internal balancing. As Saudi Arabia 
supremely has surpassed Iran in military expenditures, it is interpreted that Iran has not performed a 
sufficient internal balancing. That Saudi Arabia’s military capability is superior to Iran’s is also 
concluded by Wilner and Cordesman (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 6).  
 
Figure (2) 
 
An Illustration made from a dataset collected by the ‘Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’.  
  
In relation to neorealist theory it seems rational that Iran has assessed Saudi Arabia and Israel as 
regional threats. In theoretical terms, Iran has done so, on various parameters. Figure 2 indicates that 
their offensive power is and has been superior to Iran’s. Furthermore, the geographical proximity 
indicates a threat as both Israel and Saudi Arabia are placed near Iran. Moreover, history provides a 
series of events that indicate that the ongoing latent conflicts can manifest itself in violence. E.g.: 
  
-          1979: The Iranian Hostage crisis in Tehran (Office of the historian, 2015) 
  
-          1982: Four Iranian diplomats disappear in Lebanon (Hokayem, 2015: 2) 
 
-          1982: Nearly 90 hostages were held in Lebanon, here among an American who was laterheld 
in prison for one year in Iran (Hokayem, 2015: 2) 
 
33 
- 1983: A truck with 2000 pounds of explosive drove into a US marine compound. 241 US 
service personnel was killed. Hezbollah was held responsible (CNN, 2015) 
 
- 1983: A suicide bomber blew up the American Embassy in Lebanon killing 63, including 17 
Americans. (CIA, 2014) 
 
-          2001: A federal grand jury in the US indicted 13 people for being responsible for a truck bomb 
in Dahran, Saudi Arabia that killed 19 US servicemen. The indictment stated that the 13 persons 
were part of an Iranian Proxy (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 8) 
  
-         2007: Members of the IRGC were arrested in Iraq for engaging in sectarian warfare (Wilner & 
Cordesman, 2011: 9) 
  
These examples provide both sides of the conflict with the interpretation of the other as possessing 
aggressive intentions. Thus, Iran’s threat assessment of the neighbouring countries, including Israel and 
Saudi Arabia, entails the concepts of aggregate power, close geographical proximity and aggressive 
intentions, which according to neorealist theory will call for balancing. However, Iran’s internal 
balancing has been insufficient as international weapon embargoes have limited Iran’s ability to 
improve their military, thus making the Iranian army significantly less advanced than the army of Saudi 
Arabia (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 6). Though being incapable of transforming economic capabilities 
into military capabilities sufficiently, Iran has engaged in external balancing. Iran has built alliances 
with Hezbollah and Syria in order to form a resistance axis. In the following, it will be elaborated how 
ties to the two actors erupted. 
The triangular relationship 
In 1978 and 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon. As a counteraction, several resistance groups erupted, of 
which some were financially aided by Iran. Many of these group later merged under the name 
Hezbollah (Cramer-Larsen & Jensen, 2014: 69). The Hezbollah militia inflicted severe blows on Israeli 
forces in Lebanon, which resulted in Israeli withdrawal in 1985. By arming Hezbollah with 
sophisticated weaponry, Iran has made Hezbollah an important ally in deterring Israeli aggression, and 
also striking them in the occurrence of a crisis (Hokayem, 2015: 3). Furthermore, Hezbollah provides 
Iran with a front close to Israel. Which, among other strategic advantages, give Iran and Hezbollah the 
opportunity to attack Israel, if Israel launches an airstrike against an Iranian nuclear reactor (Malmvig, 
2014: 103).  
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The relationship between Syria and Iran is from both sides motivated by fighting common enemies. 
Both countries have worked to ensure that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would not become a dominant 
regional power. After the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, Syria provided diplomatic and military support to 
Iran. Furthermore, they have cooperated in arming and supporting Hezbollah to pressure Israel, and to 
seek influence in Lebanon (Goordarzi, 2015: 1-3). Overall, the Syria-Iran alliance has aimed at 
inhibiting growing Israeli influence and preventing American influence in the region (Haugbølle, 2006: 
2). Moreover, from an Iranian perspective, Syria has had an important role in allowing arms and other 
military components being transported through its territory, so that Iran can fund Hezbollah with 
military infrastructure etc., thus making the Iran-Syria alliance important for both Hezbollah and Iran 
(Malmvig, 2014: 103). 
  
The neorealist theory can to some extent explain the dynamics between and actions by Iran, Hezbollah 
and Syria. The hypothesis that states will perform external balancing in the form of alliances when 
addressed by greater powers and common enemies, is to a great extent evident in Iranian foreign 
policy. However, the state centric view that is central to structural realism, does entail explanatory 
errors. When examining the Iran-Hezbollah relationship and its importance, it is noteworthy that Iran 
has allied with a non-state actor in fighting Israel. A fuller understanding of this relationship will 
therefore be examined in the section The Self-perception in Iran. 
Proxy wars 
The Hezbollah militia engaged in a conflict against Israel in 2006 by launching an attack towards Israel 
in order to release long-term Lebanese prisoners. The result was a 34-day war, which cost billions of 
dollars in damage. Hezbollah’s military forces also suffered great losses. Iran reacted by contributing 
with financial and military aid to help Hezbollah reestablish infrastructure and military, and to stop 
civil losses inflicted by the war (Hokayem, 2015: 5-6). The support for Hezbollah did not only make it 
possible for them to recover, it also enabled a greater military power than before the war with Israel 
(Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 6). Iran’s support of Hezbollah can be seen as influenced by their 
strategic interest and threat assessment elaborated in above sections. Their involvement in the war can 
thus be seen as a balancing of Israel and a pursuit of regional influence. 
 
In 2011 a civil war erupted in Syria, and the survival of the Assad regime was threatened by rebellions. 
As explained, Syria is an important mechanism for Iran in abetting Hezbollah and providing them with 
arms etc., and thus maintaining a strong front against Israel. Therefore Iran has strategic interest in 
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maintaining the survival of the Assad regime, to maintain its influence in the Levant. Likewise, 
Hezbollah has interest in maintaining a regime in Syria, who will maintain the alliance with Iran and 
Hezbollah (Malmvig, 2014: 103). Iran has reacted to this potential threat of a fallen ally, and supported 
the Assad-regime after the eruption of the conflict in 2011, by sending billions of dollars in aid, 
military advisors and equipment (Goordarzi, 2015: 4). 
  
As a regional rival, it is an advantage for Saudi Arabia if the Assad regime falls, as it will create a 
strategic disadvantage and thus a lower influence and regional power for Iran. Although observers 
agree that there is no evidence that the royal family in Saudi Arabia supports actors such as ISIS and 
Jabra Al-Nusra in Syria, they agree that private donors from Saudi Arabia can very well be involved. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has publicly legitimized Syrian rebellions. However, such statements has 
been reasoned with humanitarian concerns (Malmvig, 2014:103-104). 
  
The Saudi Arabian involvement in Syria can to some extent be explained by neorealism. The intentions 
of minimizing Iran’s influence and power by diplomatically supporting rebellions opposed to an 
important ally of Iran, can very well be interpreted as a zero-sum game, in which Iran and Saudi Arabia 
try to maximize their own influence by minimizing each other’s. However, the informal link between 
Saudi Arabia and the rebellions in Syria cannot be fully explained by the state centric view that 
neorealism offers. Relying only on the intentions and actions of the state has the disadvantage of 
excluding private actors, which in this case is observed to be very important. E.g. the effect of religious 
leaders in Saudi Arabia, who encourage people to Jihad in Syria (Malmvig, 2014: 103-104). Hence, if 
and how struggles internally in Lebanon and Syria has affected Iranian foreign policy will be examined 
in the section The emerging groups in Syria. 
  
Sub-conclusion 
To sum up, Iran’s primary method of balancing has been external balancing, as international weapon 
embargoes have prohibited them from conducting a sufficient internal balancing. This, along with other 
causes, have affected that Saudi Arabia’s military capability is superior to Iran’s. The alliances with 
Hezbollah and Syria thus remain crucial for Iran. Furthermore, in Iran’s threat assessment of Saudi 
Arabia and Israel several indicators point towards them being a threat. The geographical proximity is 
important, while the military expenditures indicate that Saudi Arabia’s military capability is superior to 
Iran’s. Moreover, as the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and especially Israel in general has 
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maintained its ability to manifest into violent conflicts, it is possible that all actors perceive each 
other’s intentions as aggressive. There is little doubt that the sum of these factors has contributed to 
Iran’s involvement in Lebanon and Syria, where they have provided military assistance and financial 
support. 
 
The neorealist theory appears only partly applicable to Iran’s foreign policy. The empirical reality 
indicates that states cannot always be considered the most important subject of analysis or as ‘black 
boxes’. As aforementioned, Hezbollah is a non-state actor, while the Assad-regime struggles with non-
state actors. Hence, the depth of the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran can not be explained only 
by neorealist logics. A neoclassical realist theory that incorporates intra-groups is necessary when 
analysing the complex motivation behind Hezbollah and Lebanon’s relation with Iran. 
 
Second sub-question 
The following section will examine how the Iranian self-perception has influenced its foreign policy. 
Throughout this section the theoretical framework about groups and ideology is used. It will be 
emphasised how the Iranian policy-makers use these concepts politically in the cases of foreign policies 
in Lebanon and Syria. First the Iranian self-perception and its political importance is analysed. This 
will be applied to the conducted foreign policies in Lebanon and Syria. Scholars such as Wilner & 
Cordesman emphasise the Shiite and anti-American dimension of Iranian self-perception. It is quite 
true that Iran is Shia, but the continuing reference among scholars as anti-American/Sunni is a remnant 
from the Iranian revolution and have to be used critically.  
 
The Self-perception in Iran 
As aforementioned, the self-perception in Iran is multi-faceted. It is to a high degree defined by what it 
is not, as the religious leaders frame the Supreme Leader as the leader of the Islamic world, but with 
emphasis on Iran being Shia, not Sunni. The self-perception is also in contrast with the American 
imperialists, as they are framed as being warmongering and interventionists (Wilner & Cordesman, 
2011: 18). In the Arab-dominated region, being Persian is also paramount, as this nationalism has been 
incorporated in the Islamism that has dominated Iran since 1979 (Sherrill, 2012: 43). The Iranian self-
perception is also characterised by Iran being a unique nation in its construction and history. 
Furthermore, they perceive themselves as being the most influential country in the region (Wilner & 
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Cordesman, 2011: 17-18). The mixture of all these components in the Iranian self-perception stems 
from the revolution, where all sorts of interests had to be accounted for. The ideology of the revolution 
has had to be modified continually though, as Iran would otherwise conduct a permanent revolutionary 
foreign policy (Posch, 2013: 15).  
  
Group Processes as a Mobilizing Factor 
As mentioned in the section Group processes, nations are, according to Sterling-Folker, the most 
important group that individuals are a part of. Iranian political and religious leaders have generally 
been aware of this dynamic, as they have used the Iranian nationalism, as a mobilizing factor when 
they have found it necessary. An example of this is the way that Iranian policy-makers, especially 
Ahmadinejad, have argued that Western sanctions on Iran due to their nuclear programme, are violating 
Iranian sovereignty (Sherrill, 2012: 41). The other components of the mixed Iranian self-perception are 
also used as mobilizing factors, e.g. when Khamenei in 2011 stated that: “(...) we must support Shiite 
forces in the region and establish an anti-American axis” (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 18). Khamenei 
can also impact the way that the population are being mobilised through his appointment of religious 
leaders, who are influential through their Friday prayers. 
  
The way that many aspects of the ideology are being used as mobilising factors can be seen as a way to 
create an ‘Us vs. Them’-feeling in the Iranian population, by articulating the antagonistic relationships 
to the US, Israel, and the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, and framing states and individuals who 
are not part of the Iranian group in a negative way. In relation to theory, such articulation can be 
defined as a social practice that encourage cohesion inside the Iranian group. This is an example of out-
group discrimination and in-group favouritism is enhanced by the use of social practices. The 
differences between the out-group and in-group do not have to be vast, as one can argue is the case 
with Saudi Arabia. It is enough to emphasise even the little differences to identify the groups and 
achieve the mobilising factor. The Iranian religious and political leaders have historically mastered the 
technique of mobilising the population very well, and have been able to ‘turn it up’ in wartime, and 
restrain it again when needed to (Ward, 2005: 564). 
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The relationship between idealism and pragmatism 
Idealist foreign policy can to some degree be seen as an irrational way to conduct foreign policy, and a 
contrast to the pragmatic policies, which would be expected by neorealists. However, this is not that 
simple in the case of Iran, as the two are intertwined, and various aspects of ideology are often used as 
a way to legitimise pragmatic policies. The legitimisation is seen when the Supreme Leader defends the 
conducted foreign policy domestically. Khamenei has to answer to the powerful religious leaders in 
Iran, thus has he often spoken openly against reformist foreign policies, despite having the opportunity 
to veto them. Officially, the Supreme Leader and his office represent the idealist part of the Iranian 
foreign policy decision-making. They are however complemented by several modern research institutes 
that provide a more pragmatic view on Iran’s interests, and therefore Iranian foreign policy cannot be 
divided into idealist and pragmatic actors (Posch, 2013:13). This is why the narrative of Iranian 
ideology being Shiite, revolutionary, anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Sunni is too simplistic. 
  
As mentioned in the section Historical context, the relationship between pragmatism and ideology has 
changed over time, with the ideology being strongest in the years following the revolution, and a 
pragmatic turn in the 90’s. Despite the pragmatic turn, ideology remains the frame of reference, as 
pragmatism is rarely mentioned when political or religious leaders defend the conducted foreign policy. 
Posch describes this as a way for the Iranian government to contain ideology, rather than abandoning it 
(Posch, 2013: 18). The Iranian religious and political leaders thereby keep articulating the ideological 
aspects that strengthen their cohesion in the group and simultaneously constitute their self-perception. 
Despite the rhetoric, Iran is in many respects moving closer to cooperation with their out-group in the 
way they conduct policies, e.g. the nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries. 
  
The way that Khamenei frames the revolutionary ideology might however also be changing, e.g. when 
he in 2009 described the relationship with the US as a political opponent, which indicates that another 
thaw could be underway, as the US is normally framed as an enemy of Iran’s ideology (Posch, 2013: 
17). This change of rhetoric is consistent with the US being less militarily present in the region. The 
Supreme Leader has however not abandoned the use of ideology, as he is still using aggressive rhetoric. 
Especially Saudi Arabia has been his object of resentment, and the tension between the two potential 
regional hegemons have been building recently (Katzman, 2016: 9). 
  
The influence of the self-perception in Iran of their foreign policy seems to have been weakened with 
regards to the conflict in Syria. The mobilising efforts are not as effective, as the population does not 
39 
seem to condone the Iranian involvement or volunteer for the army. This is evident, as the Iranian 
government primarily sends well-paid ‘voluntary’ Afghan refugees, Hezbollah militiamen, and Iraqi 
Shiite military forces to Syria, instead of Iranians (Katzman, 2016: 14). The young population of Iran 
does not seem to be as committed to the ideology of the revolution (Elling, 2016: 6), and they are more 
difficult to mobilise, as they prefer an improvement of the economy instead of an expensive war. 
However, there are still examples of the Iranian population being committed to protecting the Islamic 
Republic and its allies (Ibid.).  
Sub-conclusion 
In the preceding section, the importance of the self-perception in Iran and the way that this is used in 
their foreign policy is elaborated upon. It is found that the Iranian self-perception is a mixture of 
several components with ideological ties to the Islamic revolution. Political and religious leaders have 
used the self-perception as a mobilising factor in wartime, which is in accordance with the theory of 
group processes. While Iranian foreign policies are sometimes assumed to be either pragmatic or 
idealistic, in this section it is argued that the two are intertwined, as Iran might primarily conduct 
pragmatic policies, but ideology is almost exclusively the frame of reference. The use of ideology is 
still to some extent efficient when Iranian leaders attempt to mobilise the population, but it seems as if 
the population are not as easily mobilised as earlier. It is also argued that the rhetoric towards the US 
has become less hostile, despite still being aggressive, while the hostility has increasingly been aimed 
towards Saudi Arabia.  
 
The influence of Iran’s self-perception 
 
As stated in the first sub-conclusion, the Iranian alliance with Hezbollah and Syria can be explained by 
their strategic interests. Some scholars, such as Hokayem, do however argue that Iran wanting to export 
their ideology is a significant factor. The following section addresses how the Iranian self-perception 
has influenced their foreign policy in Hezbollah and Syria. 
40 
 
Shiite Identity 
There are several examples of cultural overlaps between Hezbollah and the revolutionary ideology in 
Iran. Mainly, they regard the religious aspects of the ideology. An example of this, is that Hezbollah 
since 1985 has acknowledged Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader of Shia Islam (Takeyh, 
2006: 2). Also, Naim Qassem, Secretary of Hezbollah, stated in 2005 that the guidance from Khamenei 
is necessary in order to contain and complete the Shia Islamic project, and that he contributes to 
sustaining the rules and the system that secure justice and prosperity, both culturally, politically and 
financially within Islam. Along with these statements, Qassem argues that, “It is not realistic to carry 
out the Islamic Project with single and isolated operations. We need a guiding axis that unites the 
Muslim nation” (Lyme, 2009: 9-10) (own translation). The religious function of the Supreme Leader 
makes the Iran-Hezbollah relation even more evident, as it take precedence over regular relations with 
Beirut (Posch, 2013: 12). These examples indicate that Hezbollah is a part of the Iranian regime, 
despite not being part of the Iranian state, and that the common Shiite identity is used to legitimise 
Iran’s foreign policy in Lebanon (Ibid.).  
 
A determining factor in group integration is, according to Sterling-Folker, the perception of a common 
enemy. Both Hezbollah and Iran’s identities are, among other components,  constituted by an ideology 
that underlines the perception of American and Israeli presence as a threat. Hence, the mechanism that 
group integration is caused by a common enemy seems applicable. Hezbollah and Iran are thus 
integrating because of the perception of threat against their identity and the perception that they need 
each other to survive.  
 
Though it is evident that the shared identity of Hezbollah and Iran has helped facilitate their alliance, it 
is unclear to which degree the prominence of ideology is influential on their relations. Around the 
establishment of Hezbollah, Iran could to a high degree influence the policies of Hezbollah, but the 
relationship is more nuanced today. Some scholars argue that Hezbollah is no longer an ‘Iranian 
puppet’, but rather a strong, autonomous partner in a dynamic relationship (Haugbølle, 2006: 32) 
(Kamrava, 2007: 92). Others scholars, such as Wilner and Cordesman, present a narrative which 
implies that Iran still possesses authority over Hezbollah, as they argue that Hezbollah has become 
more dependent on Iran since 2006 (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 148). 
 
Hezbollah has a self-perception of being both a single representative of Lebanese Shiites, and an anti-
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American and -Israeli actor in both the Arabic and Persian world, not just Iran’s representative in these 
matters. Though being loyal to the Iranian regime, the Iranian political model or a submission to the 
Supreme Leader at the expense of Hezbollah’s autonomy in Lebanon, does not seem tempting for 
Hezbollah (El Husseini, 2010: 810) (Kamrava, 2007: 3).  
Hezbollah has often publicly indulged the idea of a multicultural pluralist society. However, as 
Augustus Norton claims, for many actors it is uncertain how true Hezbollah is to that position (Norton, 
2007: 489). This leads to another domestic consideration that Hezbollah has had to address, namely 
that their domestic opposition who has accused them of being a Syrian and Iranian agent, who wants to 
establish a theocratic Islamic republic like the one in Iran. Such accusations was the case after 
Hezbollah’s war with Israel in 2006 (Norton, 2007: 486). The implications of Hezbollah’s domestic 
considerations will be examined briefly in the section Hezbollah and 14. March group.  
 
If we lose Syria, we lose Tehran 
When interpreting the Syria-Iran alliance, religion is also being emphasised by some scholars. A 
narrative in the academia, which among others is advocated by Goodarzi, is that Iran supports Assad 
because the regime is Alawite, which he perceives to be a Shiite sect (Goodarzi, 2015:1). However, 
Shiism has little to do with the alliance, it is rather a case of Iranian strategic interests (Malmvig, 2014: 
103). Furthermore it is noteworthy that while the Supreme Leader and religious leaders previously has 
tried to mobilize the Iranian population by emphasizing religion, they are downplaying religion in the 
case of Syria In 2013 the Senior Foreign Affairs Advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, 
said: “Syria is the golden ring of resistance against Israel, and if it weren’t for Syria’s active 
government the country would become like Qatar or Kuwait. Iran is not prepared to lose this golden 
counterweight.” (Fulton el., 2013: 26). Hereby he emphasises the strategic importance of Syria. In May 
2016 Ayatollah Khamenei wrote on Twitter: “Syrian government is not Shia, but Islamic Republic of 
Iran supports Syrian government (…) Because those standing against  #Syria are in fact enemies to 
core of Islam and serve interests of the US and Zionist regime” (Khamenei, 2016). This statement is in 
accordance with the strategic interest concluded in the first sub-question. 
 
 
Sub-conclusion 
Iran is primarily conducting foreign policy in Lebanon and Syria on the basis of the strategic interests 
concluded in the first sub-question, but in the case of Lebanon, the foreign policy is also to some extent 
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shaped by their identity as a Shiite nation. The Iranian self-perception is thus an important intervening 
variable in their foreign policy, as pragmatic interests and ideological arguments go hand in hand when 
the motives for Iran’s foreign policy in Syria and Lebanon are analysed. 
 
Third sub-question  
The following analysis will entail an examination of how the three factions in Iran are contributing to 
the foreign policy through competition. As several factors influence their competition, the analysis will 
be divided into three parts. First, an analysis of the power of the President, the degree of state 
autonomy and the importance of the societal leaders. Afterwards, the influence of economy in group 
competition is examined. Lastly, how the Iranian political groups are influenced by the power struggles 
among groups in both Syria and Lebanon is elaborated. 
The power struggle between political groups 
In the following, the significance of the unique Iranian political structure will be put in relation to the 
conducted foreign policy, with emphasis on events in Lebanon since 2005 and Syria since 2011. The 
interaction between the different political actors and their clashing interests and the way this interferes 
with the Iranian foreign policy will be analysed on the basis of a division of political actors into 
hardliners, pragmatic conservatives and reformists. This will lead to an analysis of the degree of state 
autonomy in Iran and the powers of the societal leaders. 
  
When determining whether hardliners, pragmatic conservatives of reformists have the relative power of 
conducting foreign policy, it is obviously important to analyse the role of the Supreme Leader, as he is 
the most powerful in the Iranian political system. As aforementioned, Khamenei is considered 
somewhere in between a hardliner and a pragmatic conservative. He has strong ties with the hardliner 
religious leaders, and must, at least to some degree, legitimise his leadership to them, which is evident 
in his religious rhetoric in public speeches, e.g.: “The more human knowledge increases, the more 
likely it becomes that the message of Islam will gain ground” (Khamenei.ir, 2000). The foreign policy 
of Iran did however take a pragmatic turn when he was elected Supreme Leader, as the security of the 
nation to some degree seemed to be prioritised over a continuation of the revolutionary foreign policy. 
Hence, it is difficult to give a clear definition of Khamenei’s interests, but there is consensus in the 
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academia about the notion that he is pulling Iran in a conservative direction (Sadjadpour, 2015: 4) 
(Hunter, 2014: 258). 
  
Since 2005 the presidential office of Iran has been held by first Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and then 
Rouhani (2013-). The former being considered a hardliner, the latter a reformist. The differences in 
their presidential periods will be elaborated later. First it will be analysed which processes that led to 
these presidents, despite the most powerful actor being a hardliner/pragmatic conservative. Since the 
Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council must approve all candidates for president and the Majles, 
the two institutions must have considered Ahmadinejad and Rouhani acceptable choices for president. 
This leads to at least two possible analyses, which might both have a degree of explanatory power. 
First, the president and the Majles might have no real political power. Second, the Supreme Leader and 
the Guardian Council actually want a foreign policy that does not align with their hardliner rhetoric, 
and the presidents were pragmatic choices, which had to be taken if Iran and the Islamic regime should 
survive. 
  
The Power of the President 
The first argument is supported by the law-making processes of Iran, as there are several institutions 
making sure that the elected politicians can be obstructed if the Supreme Leader and his ‘allies’ do not 
condone their policies. The Guardian Council, who is appointed by the Supreme Leader and by the 
Head of Judiciary, who is appointed by the Supreme Leader, must make sure that all legislatures are in 
accordance with Islamic laws and the Iranian constitution. If the Majles and the Guardian Council 
disagrees, the Expediency Council, who is appointed by the Supreme Leader, settles the dispute, 
leading the power of all legislatures back to the Supreme Leader. Therefore, the Supreme Leader and 
the hardliners are able to conduct their own preferred policies, no matter who is in the parliament or the 
presidential office. 
  
The argument about the elections of presidents being pragmatic and calculated choices by the Supreme 
Leader and the group that he belongs to, presupposes that the sitting president actually matters, either 
domestically or that he has a say in the conducted foreign policy. The president might be elected as a 
way to meet the demands of the electorate, as unrest might rise if the population does not feel that they 
have a voice in politics. An example of this was seen in the Green Movement, where the population 
demanded reforms and were unsatisfied with the 2009 presidential election (Hunter, 2014: 263). The 
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Supreme Leader has undoubtedly noticed how the electorates have challenged their regimes in the 
region since 2011, and the choice of a reformist president in 2013 can be seen as a way to meet the 
Iranian people halfway. 
  
It can also be argued that the sitting president and his minister of foreign affairs actually do matter as 
executives of the foreign policy. They are the ones representing Iran officially and are being sent to 
meetings in the UN etc. This means that their diplomatic skills are crucial, which is evident as the 
change from Ahmadinejad to Rouhani has led to a change in the way that Iran is treated by the 
international society, e.g. during the negotiations about the nuclear programme (Jadaliyya, 2014). This 
indicates that the Supreme Leader prefers the direction that the presidents are taking the country, as he 
otherwise would not have approved them. 
  
An important arena in which foreign policies are being formulated, and where power struggles between 
the three political factions are supposedly fought, is the Supreme National Security Council. The 
policies being decided in the SNSC are consensus-decisions, and therefore it is difficult to pinpoint the 
actual power struggles, and which political faction that might be ‘winning’. The composition of the 
SNSC does however say a lot about the relations between the different political interests. All political 
factions are represented in the council, where knowledge is exchanged and suggestions are presented. 
The mere existence of the council indicates that the Supreme Leader takes advice before deciding on a 
foreign policy, supporting the argument of him being driven by pragmatism rather than ideology.  
  
The degree of state autonomy and the importance of societal leaders 
The political structure and the struggles between the different political factions tells a lot about the 
autonomy of the foreign policy executive, the president. As explained in the Theoretical framework, 
the foreign policy executive might conduct a foreign policy that he does not condone himself, if the 
state autonomy is relatively low. One indication of a relatively low state autonomy is that other 
political actors might be able to remove him or trump his executive powers. As there are several actors 
with overlapping responsibilities of conducting foreign policy in Iran, and the President is not the most 
powerful one, this is definitely the case. The Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and the SNSC can 
obstruct the President from conducting his policies, leaving the FPE with a low degree of  autonomy.   
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The neoclassical theory mentions the media and the population as important factors when determining 
state autonomy. The population is predominantly against the proxy wars that Iran is waging, and 
therefore they do not seem to be of most importance in this case. The media is controlled by the 
Supreme Leader and are expressing pro-war propaganda, and therefore they provide an opportunity for 
the societal leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, to exert his powers. He is undoubtedly a very powerful 
societal leader, e.g. does he have his own bureau providing him privileged information about foreign 
policy, which is normally a privilege of the foreign policy executive. Having a strong societal leader is 
in this case not necessarily leading to under- or overbalancing, as the theory otherwise argue is 
possible. The fact that the Supreme Leader has access to privileged knowledge and that he, as 
concluded earlier, has the survival of the nation as his prime interest (Elling, 2016: 3), indicate that the 
foreign policy of Iran is conducted on basis of interests that are in line with what neorealists argue that 
they would be.  
 
The Supreme Leaders, both the former Khomeini and the present Khamenei have in general been 
nationalists in economic terms, meaning that they prefer a closed Iranian economy, and as little 
interference with the neoliberal world economy as possible (Elling, 2016: 4). A shift can however be 
observed in recent years, as it has been a priority for Khamenei, through Rouhani, to lift the economic 
sanctions on Iran, and thereby to a higher degree be able to trade with other economies. A shift in the 
nationalist/internationalist perspective of the societal leaders Khomeini and Khamenei can also be 
observed in the way that Iran’s military strategy has been conducted since the revolution. Khomeini 
was an internationalist, as he tried to follow the ideology of the revolution, become a regional 
hegemon, and create an anti-American axis, with the obvious example being the war against Iraq. 
Khamenei acts more like a nationalist societal leader, especially in the 90’s and the beginning of the 
00’s, where Iran was not as aggressive as earlier. The current foreign policy is still being framed as 
defensive (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 17), but the proxy wars that Iran has been leading in Lebanon, 
Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain leads to the conclusion that Khamenei recently has taken a step 
towards being a more internationalist societal leader. 
  
Another powerful societal leader is the IRGC. They are to some degree subordinated the societal leader 
Khamenei, as Soleimani, the leader of the Guard, answers directly to the Supreme Leader (Katzman, 
2016: 4). IRGC is considered a societal leader, since they have an important voice politically, 
especially during Ahmadinejad’s presidential period (Nader, 2015: 4). Ahmadinejad, being a former 
member of the guard, had strong ties with IRGC, contrary to Rouhani, as IRGC historically has 
blocked reformist policies (Ibid.). According to neoclassical realism, this should strengthen 
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Ahmadinejad’s ability to conduct his foreign policy, as being backed by societal leaders gives an 
advantage. Rouhani might on the contrary have difficulties when trying to conduct his foreign policy, 
since lack of support from societal leaders can be problematic. This will be elaborated in Financials 
has a say. 
  
The Lieutenant Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, General Abolqassem Foroutan did in 2011 
say: “As the Commander-in-Chief (Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei) has emphasized, our fingers should 
be kept on the trigger for deterrence” (Wilner & Cordesman, 2011: 17). This indicates that they prefer 
acting as a nationalist societal leader. However, there is also an internationalist part of their military 
strategy, which is seen in both Syria and Lebanon, as the IRGC has trained, equipped and aided both 
the Syrian army and Hezbollah (Nader, 2015: 2-3). They have also sent their special forces Qod to 
participate in the Syrian conflict (Katzman, 2016: 4). On the contrary, the IRGC has politically and 
economically had a nationalist focus. Politically they are affiliated with the hardliners and protectors of 
the Islamic Republic (Nader, 2015: 4), meaning that they would rather have Iran remain isolated, than 
cooperating with the West. Economically, the IRGC has to some extent  benefitted from being isolated 
as well. The sanctions on Iran has meant that the IRGC has few competitors on the Iranian market, and 
their nationalist preferences were especially understandable during Ahmadinejad’s presidential period, 
as he awarded them hundreds of no-bid government contracts. The IRGC is however fragmented, and 
there has been a growing part of the group that prefers the sanctions being abandoned (Ibid.: 4).  
 
Sub-conclusion 
To sum up, the political power is definitely primarily in the hands of the Supreme Leader, the 
hardliners, and the pragmatic conservatives, who must approve and are able to trump the President. 
However, this is a truth with modifications, as they, at least to some degree, must listen to their 
population to keep their powerful status, and the elected presidents also has a say in the Iranian foreign 
policy. The fact that other actors in the political system have authority to trump the president indicates 
that there is a low degree of state autonomy. This is partly related to the powerful societal leader, the 
Supreme Leader. He does however seem to consider the nation’s interests, on the same grounds as the 
FPE as he has access to privileged information, giving him optimal conditions for choosing an 
appropriate foreign policy. This affects that, though there is a low degree of state autonomy, the chosen 
foreign policy, has been in accordance with the systemic imperatives.  
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Both economically and militarily Khamenei has in general had a nationalist perspective, but recently 
there has been indications of him being more of an internationalist societal leader. The societal leader 
IRGC is true to the ideology of the revolution, as they pull Iran towards acting as a regional hegemon, 
by being active in the conflicts of the region. Hence, they are acting as internationalist societal leaders. 
Despite recently being more open towards negotiating with the 5+1 about the nuclear programme, they 
are still considered nationalist on the economic and political parameter. 
Financials has a say 
As the second greatest exporter of oil in the world Iran is heavily dependent on its foreign relations. 
This is conflicting with their ideological notion of an economically independent Iran, as being a more 
integrated part of the international market means international trading partners. The income from oil 
production is high, but it cannot secure the future of Iranian economy, as Iran lacks economic growth in 
other sectors, which causes financial problems (Takeyh, 2006: 121). 
  
Iran’s total unemployment rate was 10.5 % in 2015, and youth unemployment was at 28.7 %. In 2014, 
the inflation rate was the lowest since 2006 at 12.2 % (CIA Factbook, 2008) (Databank, 2015). The 
economy is suffering from tax evasion and corruption. Despite a growing middle class and an improved 
standard of living, Iran is still experiencing problems with inequality. In 2010, approximately 10 
million Iranians lived under the poverty line, while the relative poverty was measured to 7-10 % in 
2016. The increasing poverty is a problem that both the population and the political elites are worried 
about (Elling, 2016: 4). 
  
The increasing financial problems have created a situation where the reformists and pragmatic-
conservatives have gained influence in the Majles. Keeping Iran’s economy isolated does not solve 
their financial problems or satisfy the population, hence the difficult financial situation has increased 
group competition between the hardliners and the reformists/pragmatic-conservatives on the issue of 
expenditures on the engagements in Syria and Lebanon. This will be elaborated in the section Can we 
afford it?  
 
First, it must be underscored that it is highly difficult to assess Iran’s exact expenditures on the 
alliances. However, it is well known that it is expensive to be involved in military conflicts. Several 
scholars have conducted research, which shows that apx. 2 bn USD per year (2006) is spent on 
supporting Hezbollah, a number that is still increasing (Lyme, 2009: 24). The US Foreign Ministry 
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assessed the support up to 100 mio. USD per year in the 90’s. In 2015, Staffan de Misture, UN special 
envoy in Syria, estimated that 6 billion USD was annually spent on supporting Assad’s regime. Other 
research shows that expenditures were around 14 billion USD between 2012-2013 (Lake, 2015). The 
exact numbers are not crucial for making an analysis, but there is a consensus about the expenditures 
being high enough to influence the Iranian economy negatively. Rather, the political implications of the 
military spendings are relevant, as they have influenced the dynamics of the power struggle between 
the political actors in Iran. 
  
Can we afford it?  
Since 2006, there has been a tendency in Iran to question to which degree they should support 
Hezbollah and Syria. Reformists have been worried about the economic consequences since 
Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel in 2006 because it “(…) was adding to the Iranian people’s 
economic deprivation—deprivation that had not diminished despite then-high oil prices (Thaler et. al, 
2010: 90). The solution to many of Iran’s economic problems are perceived to be an opening of the 
economy, and thereby an abandonment of the economic sanctions. Though, if these sanction shall be 
abandoned, Iran must act differently in the international community. This has historically been the 
politics of the reformists, and therefore the increased inequality and financial problems have created an 
opportunity for reformists, such as Rouhani, to gain influence in foreign policy questions. However, not 
all political actors will acquire economic prosperity as a consequence of an abandonment of the 
economic sanctions. Several members of the IRGC prefer an isolated economy, as they have benefitted 
from not competing on an open market (Al-Monitor, 2016b).  
 
The argument of a heightened influence of the reformists is supported by several scholars, such as 
Monshipouri and Dorraj, who argue that Rouhani is legitimised through support from the electorate, 
and that he speaks on their behalf when he questions Iran’s involvement in foreign conflicts. The 
discontent in the electorate is evident in the forming of groups such as the Green Movement, whose 
wishes the religious and political leaders, according to Monshipouri and Darraj, must incorporate in 
their politics. Hence, the electorate can pressure the religious and political leaders to bring down Iran’s 
financial support of Assad and Hezbollah (Monshipouri & Dorraj, 2013: 134). 
However, the Green Movement may also be used to exemplify that the hardliners’ power still trumps 
the reformists’ to a high degree, because they have succeeded in keeping down protests (Elling, 2016: 
5). This indicates that the Iranian people are either too afraid to protest or that their financial situation is 
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bearable. Another explanation could be the failed Arab Spring in neighbouring countries, which has led 
to civil wars, and does not seem like a better option than the status quo. 
 
In January 2016, Rouhani presented his budget bill to the Majles. It has created competition between 
the reformist-Rouhani-administration and the hardliner former IRGC generals in the Parliament. The 
bill shows that Rouhani overall wants to reduce the defense budget and reform Iran’s security priorities. 
More specifically, he suggests a decrease in IRGC’s budget by 16 %, which is a total amount of 900 
million dollars that brings their budget down to 4.1 billion dollars. This is exactly enough to cover 
IRGC’s costs, but not their foreign expenditures (Al-Monitor, 2016b).  
 
Two explanations to the bill can be analysed. First, the reduction of the total budget reflects an 
administration whose interest is to decrease its military expenditures, and invest in other sectors that 
lack economic growth. This could decrease the inequality and improve the economic situation in Iran. 
Second, the increased funding of the regular army, from 1.5-1.75 bn, and the Ministry of Defense, from 
770-890 mio. shows a determination to reform, by maintaining the organisations that are suffering from 
underfunding (Ibid.). Members of the Majles, especially former IRGC generals, have modified the bill, 
in order to keep the IRGC-funding at its highest possible level according to the Iranian constitution 
(Ibid.). Hence, it is evident that Rouhani is impeded by the conservative groups in Iran, who has an 
economic interest in a continuing isolation and a maintenance of the alliances with Hezbollah and 
Assad.  
 
Sterling-Folker argues that intragroup interaction can be formed as a competition, which is evident in 
the power struggle over the Iranian economy. Furthermore, she explains that intragroup interaction can 
be influenced from outside the group (in this case outside Iran) as well. As evident in the section above, 
the reformists and the IRGC have different views upon how to govern the economy, and are competing 
over influencing it. Thus, this interaction is characterized as a competition. Furthermore, as the poor 
economy is partly due to economic sanctions, the group competition is partly facilitated by external 
events.  
 
Another point made by Sterling-Folker is that intragroup competitions are often over ‘who gets what’. 
As elaborated in the section above, different ‘views’ on how to govern the economy entails a high 
degree of ‘who gets what’. Another feature about intragroup competition, is that it, while it can be 
influenced by external competition (e.g. Iran receiving sanctions, due to conducted foreign policy), the 
intragroup competition is also influencing external competition. It is thus a dynamic process. In the 
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case of reformists and IRGC competing over how to govern the economy, they are influencing the 
external competition. This is evident, as the reformists, as elaborated above, indulge economic policies 
that seek an abandonment of the sanctions and reduce expenditure on military engagement, which must 
entail a shift in international behaviour (hence the external competition). In general, the theory of group 
processes is highly applicable when examining the group competition that relates to Iran’s economy.  
 
Sub-conclusion 
To sum up, Iran’s financial situation is problematic, which affects the population through high 
inequality, high unemployment rate, etc. This means that the high expenditures on the engagements in 
Lebanon and Syria are increasingly met by discontent in the population. The situation is to a high 
degree an effect of the economic sanctions imposed by the West, which has kept the Iranian economy 
isolated. This has led to a power struggle among the political factions in Iran, as the reformists have 
gained support in the electorate, while the hardliners prefer keeping the Iranian economy isolated, and 
the alliances maintained. The struggle is evident in the response to Rouhani’s budget bill, which 
involves a reduction of IRGC’s budget and a reformation of Iran’s security policies. The bill has been 
modified in the Majles and the hardliners have succeeded in obstructing Rouhani’s proposed policy 
changes. Furthermore, the competition between the reformists and IRGC, exemplifies the theory of 
group processes.   
 
 
Feedback on Iranian foreign policy  
 
In the following section, an analysis of how the political groups responsible for foreign policy in Iran 
are influenced by groups in Syria and Lebanon, will be conducted. In the first part of the analysis the 
feedback of events in Lebanon to the foreign policy in Iran will be examined. The second part will 
analyse how power struggles in Syria has both facilitated a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy, and 
given the foreign policy a characteristic of identity politics. 
 
As the analysis has shown, among the three factions, the hardliners is the most influential grouping, as 
it holds institutional positions that entail the right to veto foreign policy decisions and are independent 
from public elections. Furthermore, the hardliners is also the group that requests the most aggressive 
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foreign policy. The fact that the hardliners possess the more ‘aggressive’ role of the three groups is, as 
earlier explained, evident in their revolutionary ideals, as well as in their rhetoric. The reformists is the 
group most reluctant to aggressive foreign policy, while the pragmatic conservatives is somewhere in 
the middle. 
 
When Iran’s ally is in conflict it can influence the competition for influence among the hardliners, the 
pragmatic conservatives and the reformists. One implication, of an ally in conflict is that it provides the 
hardliners with the possibility to articulate the anti-American and part of the Iranian ideology. Under 
such events the hardliners can display political opponents as traitors, while emphasising the need to 
fight Western imperialism. In a historical note Rasmus Elling describes it as following: 
 
“Under pressure from outer enemies the people in power can display the opposition as traitors while 
solutions to structural and economic problems is postponed with reference to a state of emergency. At 
the same time, the conservative forces and the Revolutionary Guard can cement their power and 
provoke the West, Israel and Saudi Arabia into conflicts, which are small, but exactly large enough, to 
keep the story that the Islamic republic constitutes and important resistance against Western 
imperialism alive” (Own translation) (Elling, 2016: 6). 
  
Ahmadinejad’s term was at least to some extent an example of a hardliner who tried to take advantage 
of the dynamic that Elling describes. Ahmadinejad was in charge in the period after Hezbollah’s 2006 
war with Israel. He adopted a very harsh rhetoric which especially was aimed towards Israel. Speeches 
included strong elements of national pride, religion and anti-semitism (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2008: 
123). Relying on Elling’s observation that the hardliners’ domestic relations benefits from ‘outer 
pressure’, it can be assumed that Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric also had domestic oriented motivations. 
 
The emerging groups in Syria 
The Syrian regime is politically marginalized in structure as the Alawittes are extremely 
overrepresented in both military and government (Cramer-Larsen & Jensen, 2014: 59). Meanwhile, the 
majority of the opposition groups are Sunni Muslims and Kurdish. However, the ethnicity and religion 
of the different groups in Syria will not be the object for categorizing the different groups in Syria, as 
the fighting groups in Syria are both secular and extremist (Ibid.: 62). As this section examines the 
groups’ feedback on Iranian foreign policy, the objective for dividing the groups, will be if the agenda 
of the groups is in accordance with Iran’s strategic interests or not. As aforementioned, Iran have 
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strategic interest in keeping Assad in power, thus the simple categorization of the various groups is 
divided into the Assad regime and the rebellions. 
 
In 2011, when the civil war in Syria began, Iran supported the Assad regime with military advisors, 
equipment and billions of dollars in aid (Goordarzi, 2015: 4). This was due to strategic interests, which 
was shared by Hezbollah. In 2013, Iran interpreted Assad’s ability to fight the rebellions as being 
insufficient. Also, Hezbollah was critical towards Assad’s sufficiency. In a speech in May 2013, the 
general secretary of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah harshing his rhetoric stating that: “Syria is the back of 
the resistance, and the resistance cannot stand, arms folded, while its back is broken”, (The Guardian, 
2013). 
 
One main point that can be derived from this development, is that the conflict among groups in Syria 
has a feedback on the foreign policy of Iran as they are contributing to the military capabilities of 
Hezbollah. Moreover, as a result of the interpretation that Assad was unable to win the war, Iran 
decided to contribute further to the Assad regime (Posch, 2013: 29). Another central characteristic of 
Hassan Nasrallah’s speech is that he indicates that the conflict is internationalized. In his speech he 
assimilates the rebellions with the old rivals to the resistance axis: “If Syria falls into the hands of 
America, Israel and the takfiris, the people of our region will go into a dark period” (The Guardian, 
2013).  
 
As explained in first sub-question, religious leaders in Saudi Arabia have encouraged people to Jihad in 
Syria (Malmvig, 2014: 103). This contributes to Nasrallah’s narrative that the conflict in Syria is both 
regional and international and not only domestic. Malmvig argues that the conflict in Syria has created 
intense sectarian tensions in the Levant and in Syria. In her argument she refers to Shiite leaders who 
demeans Sunni Muslims and vice versa. Furthermore, she argues that both Hezbollah and Iran use 
hateful propaganda against the rebellions and Saudi Arabia in order to gain regional backup. The latter 
is evident in Hassan Nasrallah’s speech in which he uses the term ‘takfiri’, which is associated with the 
extremist Salafist movement. The foreign policy of Iran and Hezbollah has thus become more 
characterised by politics that appeal to identity.  
 
In relation to the theory of group formation and group identity by Sterling-Folker, the increased 
sectarian tensions can be explained by the development of the social practices by Hezbollah, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. Sterling-Folker argues that social practices and institutions can enable a strong cohesion 
in a group and thus make a group more competitive. The change of rhetoric in Nasrallah’s speech and 
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the religious leaders’ aggressive speeches in Iran and Saudi Arabia can be interpreted as such social 
practices, as they are motivated by enabling a regional backup. Furthermore, as the aggressive rhetoric 
in both groups are aimed towards each other  sectarian tensions became stronger. Or, in theoretical 
terms: the differences are reified. 
 
Sub-conclusion  
The impact of Hezbollah’s war with Israel, can have had some influence on the rhetoric of the 
hardliners. The most direct effect of Hezbollah’s interactions is the financial support Iran has aided to 
Hezbollah after the war in 2006. A case in which the the internal struggle clearly has appeared effectful 
on the Iranian foreign policy, is the case of Syria. The civil war has been an important factor in Iran’s 
and Hezbollah’s foreign policy toward Syria. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The following will answer how the domestic conditions in Iran and the political situation in the Middle 
East, in a neoclassical perspective, have influenced Iranian foreign policy between 2005 and 2016. The 
essential findings of the analysis will be underlined, leading to a discussion of the degree of 
explanatory satisfaction that neoclassical realism provides in the example of Iran. 
  
In the analysis of the systemic imperatives it is found that Iran’s threat assessment has encouraged them 
to balance their perceived enemies, primarily the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iran primarily balance 
through the use of proxies, e.g. in Lebanon and Syria. The establishment of alliances is in accordance 
with the neorealist theory of balancing, and Iran’s behaviour supports the notion of the international 
system as a zero-sum game. The enemies and alliances of Iran are, at least to some degree, a product of 
the Iranian self-perception, which stems from the revolution of 1979. The ideological components of 
the self-perception are being used as mobilising factors during wartime, and ideology is in general used 
pragmatically in Iranian foreign policy. Pragmatism and ideology are however intertwined in the case 
of Iran. The Shiite component of Iran’s self-perception has helped facilitate an alliance with Hezbollah. 
However, Shiism is not an aspect of the alliance with Syria. The group dynamics are also evident in the 
intertwined relationship between Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, as they share common enemies, and thus 
have created an alliance. 
54 
 
The political structure in Iran is a determining factor in the power struggle between hardliners, 
pragmatic conservatives and reformists, when foreign policy is conducted in Iran. In general, the 
structure keeps the executive power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, and it gives political 
institutions, controlled by hardliners, veto powers over the President. Hence, the autonomy of the 
foreign policy executive is low in Iran, but the President does however matter, as his diplomatic skills 
are relevant. The analysis of the societal leader Khamenei being a vital part of determining Iran’s 
foreign policy, does however not necessarily mean that Iran is under- or overbalancing through their 
engagement in the region, as Khamenei has access to privileged knowledge about international 
relations due to the SNSC and his bureau, and his primary concern seems to be the survival of Iran. He 
must however consider interests of other powerful political actors who are devoted to the ideology of 
the revolution, such as religious leaders and the IRGC. 
  
An important factor in Iran’s ability to wage war is its financial strength. Iran has been suffering from 
the sanctions imposed by the West, which has made it difficult for the leaders to legitimise conducting 
an expensive war in Syria. The low state autonomy is evident in this case, as president Rouhani is 
challenged in making changes, due to unwillingness from especially the Guardian Council and the 
IRGC. Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah has also been expensive, as Iran has aided them financially 
during and after several conflicts. The rhetoric of Iran has also been supportive of Hezbollah, as they 
aggressively have defended, along with Syria. This rhetoric by the alliance can be seen as a social 
practice that enhances the sectarian tensions in the Middle Eastern region. 
  
The neoclassical realist theory is in general applicable to the case of Iranian foreign policy, but some 
weaknesses have however been observed. A key argument in the neoclassical realist theory is that the 
systemic imperatives are the most decisive, independent variable, while the domestic factors are 
intervening variables, which are less defining for the conducted foreign policy. This is in accordance 
with what is found in this study. E.g. does the political system influence the foreign policy, as the 
structure enhances the power of religious leaders, who are dedicated to the ideology of the revolution. 
However, it is found in the analysis that Iran primarily acts pragmatically, as the security of the nation 
has priority over the ideology, leading to the conclusion that the hardliners of Iranian politics react 
rationally to the systemic imperatives, while legitimising it through religious rhetoric. It is however 
difficult to distinguish between the systemic and national level, as the two intertwine and influence 
each other reciprocally. E.g. balancing the threat of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia is considered a 
correct response to systemic imperatives, but the reason for these states being perceived as enemies in 
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the first place is found in the ideology of the revolution, which is a domestic factor. With the division 
made in this study, the systemic imperatives are however considered the most determining factor for 
Iranian foreign policy. Therefore, the neoclassical realist theory has a high degree of explanatory power 
in the case of Iranian foreign policy. 
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